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Abstract:  
Followed by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which approved the 
collection of a defendant’s DNA upon arrests under the Fourth Amendment, the Minister of 
Justice, Peter MacKay indicated in an interview with the Globe and Mail that he and his 
Ministry are considering a similar model for Canada. 
 
This paper examines the possibility of a similar legislative framework in Canada and argues 
that although collection of DNA upon arrests was found justified under the Fourth 
Amendment, it does not necessarily mean that it will be found justified under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. While s.8 of the Charter seems to give similar protection as 
the Fourth Amendment, they have very different requirements for judicial authorization, 
reasonableness and standard of probable cause. 
 
Scrutinizing those different requirements and standards, this paper holds that the process 
of DNA collection is highly intrusive and would be a serious violation of s.8 of the Charter as 
it could reveal an excessive amount of private information about an individual over which 
he/she has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, it will deprive people 
from their right to be presumed innocent, which is protected under s.11 (d) and significantly 
impact socially marginalized groups. 
 
Finally, this paper conducts an analysis of the violations under s.1 of the Charter and 
indicates that none of the violations can be justified in a free and democratic society. 
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ABSTRACT 
Followed by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, which approved the collection 
of a defendant’s DNA upon arrests under the Fourth Amendment, the Minister of Justice, Peter 
MacKay indicated in an interview with the Globe and Mail that he and his Ministry are 
considering a similar model for Canada.  
This paper examines the possibility of a similar legislative framework in Canada and argues that 
although collection of DNA upon arrests was found justified under the Fourth Amendment, it 
does not necessarily mean that it will be found justified under the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms. While s.8 of the Charter seems to give similar protection as the Fourth 
Amendment, they have very different requirements for judicial authorization, reasonableness and 
standard of “probable cause”.  
Scrutinizing those different requirements and standards, this paper holds that the process of DNA 
collection is highly intrusive and would be a serious violation of s.8 of the Charter as it could 
reveal an excessive amount of private information about an individual over which he/she has a 
strong reasonable expectation of privacy. Furthermore, it will deprive people from their right to 
be presumed innocent, which is protected under s.11 (d) and significantly impact socially 
marginalized groups.  
Finally, this paper conducts an analysis of the violations under s.1 of the Charter and indicates 
that none of the violations can be justified in a free and democratic society. 
INTRODUCTION: 
In a recent judgment, the Supreme Court of the United States approved the collection of a 
defendant’s DNA upon arrests under the Fourth Amendment.1  Interestingly, it seems that 
Canadian legislatures found this decision very inspiring as the Minister of Justice, Peter MacKay 
expressed in an interview with the Globe and Mail that he and his Ministry are considering a 
similar model for Canada. Historically, Canada has been under the influence of American legal 
developments since the day the first Canadian Criminal Code was enacted.2 Therefore, it will 
not be surprising if Canada adopts a similar model despite the fact that some criminal defense 
lawyers and civil liberty advocates already warned the governments about its potential 
constitutional invalidity and its violation of individual’s rights and freedom. 3  
While the Supreme Court of the United States finds collecting DNA from arrestees is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, which protects individuals from “unreasonable 
searches and seizures”, it does not necessarily mean that it may be found reasonable under the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom.4 There are two provisions of the Charter that could be 
infringed if such an approach is adopted - (i) right to be secure against unreasonable search or 
seizure under s. 8; and (ii) presumptions of innocence under s.11 (d). It is important to note that 
1 Maryland v King, [2013] US LEXIS 4165 at 3-28. 
2 Polygamy was added to Canadian criminal code under the influence of American legislature in the first Canadian 
Criminal Code in 1889 despite the fact that there was no polygamist in Canada on that time. See, Washim Ahmed, 
“Criminalization of Polygamy in Canada: Historical, Legal and Sociological Analysis” (2014), 10 Osgoode Legal 
Studies Research Paper Series 78, online: Social Science and Research Network 
< http://ssrn.com/abstract=2508804>.es  
3 Kim Mackrael, “Feds looks at plan to collect DNA from suspects upon arrestl, The Glove and Mail (2 October 2013) online: 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/ottawa-looks-at-plan-to-collect-dna-from-suspects-upon-
arrest/article14652881/.  
4 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of therConstitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canadag 
Schedul anadag Schedule B to thebe referred as the Charter too]. 
  
although s.8 of the Charter seems to give similar protection as the Fourth Amendment, they have 
very different requirements for judicial authorization, reasonableness and standard of probable 
cause.5 This paper scrutinizes those different requirements and standards6 and holds the view that 
the process of DNA collection is highly intrusive as it could reveal an excessive amount of 
private information about an individual over which he/she has a strong reasonable expectation of 
privacy. In essence, DNA collection from arrestees will be a serious violation of s.8 of the 
Charter. Furthermore, it will deprive people from their right to be presumed innocent, which is 
protected under s.11 (d). 
In doing so, this essay is divided into three parts. Part I gives an overview of the various 
requirements of s.8 of the Charter and analyzes whether collecting DNA from arrestees could 
meet those requirements. Part II describes the idea of the presumption of innocence and 
demonstrates how individuals will be deprived of this right if their DNA is collected upon 
arrests. Finally, part III examines whether any of those violation could be justified in a free and 
democratic society under s.1 of the Charter.    
 
PART I – VIOLATION OF S.8: 
In R. v. Rao, a reference was made to the Ontario Court of Appeal to determine whether a 
provision of the Narcotic Control Act is "reasonable" within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charter. 
As a response, the court indicates that there are two grounds based on which a challenge to the 
                                                
5 Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, loose-leaf (Toronto: Carswell, 2006) at 48-3. 
6 An important point should be noted that this paper does not go onto comparing the requirements of the Fourth 
Amendment and s.8 because this is beyond its scope. Therefore, it will only focus on the requirements of s.8 and 11 
(d). Also, it is virtually impossible to assess the actual implication and the gravity of the infringements in absence of 
a specific wording of the Criminal Code. Thus, this paper is written primarily based on different probabilities and 
certain assumptions will be made accordingly.   
  
reasonableness of a particular search may be made under s.8 of the Charter – firstly, the 
constitutionality of the legislation that authorizes the search; secondly, the reasonableness of the 
search itself that was carried out under a constitutionally valid statute.7 This essay will examine 
both – the constitutionality of a potential legislation that would authorize DNA collection and the 
reasonableness of a search that would involve DNA collection. However, before going to this 
examination, it is important to determine whether collection of DNA could be considered as a 
search under the meaning of s.8 and whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists with 
respect to collecting DNA from arrestees.  
 
What is a search or a seizure under s.8? 
A search, under s.8, is defined as “an examination...of a person’s person or property in order 
to look for evidence”	  and a seizure is taking away anything by the agents of the state in order to 
use it for evidence.8 While both search and seizure are protected under s. 8, it only protects the 
person not the property.9 Collecting DNA from arrestees clearly falls within the definition of 
search and seizure under s.8 as it involves examining a person’s bodily sample and seizing it for 
the purpose of law enforcement. Moreover, it is also evident from the Ontario Court of Appeal`s 
decision in R v. Alderton that a search incidental to a lawful arrest can include taking samples of 
an accusedus hair.10 
 
                                                
7 R v Rao (1984), 46 OR (2d) 80 (CA) at 90. 
8 Hogg supra note 5 at 48-4. 
9 Ibid. 
10 R v Alderton, [1985] 49 OR (2d) 257 (CA). 
  
What is a reasonable expectation of privacy and does it involve in DNA Collection?  
 There is no exhaustive definition of privacy. Binnie J. describes it as a “protean 
concept”11 because it evolves over time. The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that an 
individual possess three distinct privacy interests - personal privacy, territorial privacy and 
informational privacy. Personal privacy involves the bodily integrity of a person; the right not to 
have our bodies touched or explored to disclose objects or matters we wish to conceal.12  
Territorial privacy goes “beyond our bodies and the places where we live and work”. 13 
Informational privacy includes ched or explored to disclose oups, or institutions to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to others”.14 
In Canada, privacy right is protected under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom. 
Section 8 of the Charter provides everyone the right to be secured against unreasonable search 
and seizure. Section 8 plays an extremely important role in criminal law context. It protects 
reasonable expectation of privacy of an accused and imposes a requirement of reasonableness on 
the law enforcement and other governmental agencies in terms of the techniques and procedures 
that they can use in obtaining information about an alleged offender or crime.15 Any evidence 
collected without respecting the reasonable expectation of privacy of an alleged offender may be 
excluded by the virtue of s.24 (2) of the Charter. However, it should be noted that not all 
violations of privacy are protected under s.8. Canadian courts have indicated that s.8 does not 
necessarily immune someone from all searches and seizures but only from those that are 
                                                
11 R v Tessling [2004] 3 SCR 432. 
12 Ibid at 19-23. 
13 Ibid.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Hogg supra note 5 at 48-2. 
  
unreasonable. The courts further indicate that the question of whether an intrusion is unjustified 
is highly contextual and a balanced approach must be taken to mitigate the cost of breaching 
privacy rights and government’s interest in the administration of justice. 16 However, the courts 
suggest no single test for the determination of the existence and infringements of someone 
inreasonable expectation of privacy. Rather, the court takes a “Totality of the Circumstances” 17 
approach and indicates that such a determination should be made based on the circumstance of 
the case at hand.18   
 In R v. Plant, based on a number of contextual factors, Sopinka J. sets out a framework to 
determine the existence of a person's reasonable expectation of privacy. He states, 
Consideration of such factors as the nature of the information itself, the nature 
of the relationship between the party releasing the information and the party 
claiming its confidentiality, the place where the information was obtained, the 
manner in which it was obtained and the seriousness of the crime being 
investigated allow for a balancing of the societal interests in protecting 
individual dignity, integrity and autonomy with effective law enforcement. 
[emphasis added]19 
 
According to the Plant’s factors, first and foremost, the nature of the DNA information and 
individuals’ claim over it should be examined in order to determine the existence of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. 
                                                
16 Hunter v Southam Inc, [1984] 2 SCR 145 at 159-160. 
17 Tessling supra note 11. 
18 It should be noted that it is possible to determine the existence of privacy interests and reasonableness of a search 
applying only Tessling Test. However, instead of relying entirely on Tessling, this essay uses different tests that 
were conducted in different circumstances to break down the specific and relevant legal issues and provide a clear 
and comprehensive legal analysis. Also there are some overleaps betweens various factors of those different tests, 
but this essay will identify the points of repetition and avoid them accordingly.    
19 R v Plant, [1993] 3 SCR 281. 
  
DNA or deoxyribonucleic acid has been described as the "building block of life”	  which is 
found in all the cells of a human body. 20 Usually, when a bodily substance is left at a crime 
scene, it is collected and analyzed to create a DNA profile that can be matched against a 
substance taken from a suspect.21 A single DNA can provide unique patterns of information that 
can be compared between DNA artifacts and samples to confirm or exonerate a suspect. The 
analytical technique of matching or comparing DNA samples is based on fundamental principles 
of human genetics.22  
Genetic uniqueness is a fact of life. From generation to generation, characteristics are 
inherited, combined, assorted, and reassorted among individuals through a common 
denominator: the chemical deoxyribonucleic acid, or DNA. And, except in the case 
of identical twins, no two humans share the same DNA sequence.23 
 
The samples collected from criminal suspects have the potential to reveal everything 
about an individual's genetic makeup including core biological traits, family tree and familial 
relationships, height, hair color, skin-color and vulnerability to certain diseases. 24 Science has 
not yet been able to determine the limits of the amount of information that can be collected from 
DNA but has confirmed that it could provide clues to behaviour, intelligence, and other core 
biographical information about an individual.25 No two human beings can have similar DNA 
                                                
20 Canada, Solicitor-General of Canada, Establishing a National DNA Data Bank (Consultation Paper) (Ottawa: 
Ministry of Supply and Services, 1996) at 2 [hereinafter DNA Data Bank (Consultation Paper)]. See also FW 
Drobner, "DNA Dragnets: Constitutional Aspects of Mass DNA Identification Testing" (2000), 28 Cap UL Rev 479 
at 479. 
21 MJ Markett, "Genetic Diaries: An Analysis of Privacy Protection in DNA Data Banks" (1996), 42 Case W Res L 
Rev 635. 
22 US Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Genetic Witness: Forensic Uses of DNA Tests, OTA-BA-438 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1990) at 3. 
23 Ibid. 
24 PL Bereano, "The Impact of DNA-based Identification Systems on Civil Liberties" in Billings, ed DNA on Trial: 
Genetic Identification and Criminal Justice (New York: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press, 1992) at 123. 
25 ET Juengst, "I-DNA-fication, Personal Privacy, and Social Justice" (1999), 75 Chi-Kent L Rev 61 at 64.  
  
pattern, and the information that DNA can provide is so profound and accurate that it led many 
commentators to equate DNA typing with fingerprinting.26 
While DNA information could be extremely helpful for the criminal justice system, it 
could also reveal excessive amount of private information about an individual over which the 
person has a strong reasonable expectation of privacy. As the Supreme Court of Canada said in R 
v. Plant, an individual enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his or her core 
biographical personal information held by others if the information seized is of a "personal and 
confidential" nature. Section 8 of the Charter "should seek to protect a biographical core of 
personal information which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain 
and control from dissemination to the state. This would include information which tends to 
reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual".27 
Moreover, the fact that DNA is a part of an individual’s bodily substance, a person has 
the highest claim of ownership and control over it. This control and ownership reinforces a 
strong reasonable expectation of privacy as mentioned in R v. Belnavis.28 However, the court 
also clarified that the idea of the right to privacy is not necessarily tied to property, but rather the 
basic requirement of individual freedom obliges the state to respect the dignity, autonomy and 
integrity of the individual.29 The degree of privacy, which the law protects, is closely linked to 
the effect that a breach of that privacy would have on the freedom and dignity of the individual. 
Therefore, a person is entitled to an extremely high expectation of privacy in relation to his or 
                                                
26Julianne Parfett, “ rfett,  arfett, , and Social Justice" (1999), 75 Chi-K, (2002) 29 Man LJ 33 at 2. 
27 Plant supra note 19 at  293. 
28  R v Belnavis, [1997] 3 SCR 341. [In this case, the court found that Ms. Belnavis had the right to privacy because 
the car was in her control, she was legally entitled to drive it and had ownership of the contents searched by the 
police. However, the court rejected the right to privacy of the passengers because they had no control or ownership 
over the car or the contents under search]. 
29 Ibid. 
  
her bodily integrity30 or residence31 and entitled to a lesser expectation in relation to a vehicle in 
which he or she is merely a passenger,32 or an apartment to which he or she is a visitor.33  
 
Does collection of DNA from arrestees constitute a violate s.8 of the Charter? 
Since the nature of the DNA and the information that it can reveal are so personal to an 
individual, collecting such information without any consent or judicial authorization would be a 
clear deprivation of an individual’s right to reasonable expectation of privacy. The decisions in 
Belnavis and Hunter clearly suggest that a warrantless search not pursuant to any statute is 
always unconstitutional and unjustified.34 In R. v. Belnavis, relying on previous circumstantial 
tests outlined by the Supreme Court of Canada in different cases, the Ontario Court of Appeal 
held that a warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable unless it complies with three 
requirements of reasonableness: (a) the search must be authorized by a statute or common law; 
(b) the statute that authorizes the search must be reasonable; and (c) the manner in which the 
search was carried out must be reasonable.35  
Assuming that the DNA collection from an arrestee will be authorized by the DNA 
Identification Act, the remaining key determinative factors pursuant to this test are 
reasonableness of the statute and the reasonableness of the manner of collection. The factors that 
qualify reasonableness of a statute, which involves someone’s right to privacy, were articulated 
in Hunter v. Southam. In Hunter, the Supreme Court of Canada found the Combines 
                                                
30 R v Stillman, [1997] 1 SCR 607. 
31 R v Feeney, [1997] 2 SCR 117. 
32 Belnavis supra 28. 
33 R28.avis 2  [1996] 1 SCR 128. 
34 Hogg supra note 5 at 48-26. 
35 Belnavis supra note 28 at 13. 
  
Investigation Act contrary to s.8 of the Charter because it did not include three requirements of 
reasonableness. The court held that in order for a search mandated by a statute to be reasonable, 
the statute must stipulate: (1) a requirement of a warrant obtained prior to the commission of the 
search; (2) a requirement of an arbiter “capable of acting judicially”	   and not involved in the 
investigation; and (3) a requirement of “reasonable and probable grounds”	  sworn under oath. 
In applying the Hunter factors to the idea of DNA collection, it can be assumed that like 
the American DNA Fingerprint Act,36 there will be no requirement to obtain a warrant prior to 
the collection of DNA since most of the arrests happen incidentally. The current DNA 
Identification Act37 also does not require a warrant to be issued in order to collect DNA samples 
from convicted criminals. Since there would be no requirement of a warrant; there would be no 
requirements of an impartial arbiter and reasonable and probable grounds sworn under oath. 
Therefore, further analysis of these factors is redundant and it becomes evident that collecting 
DNA from arrestees would not meet the requirements of reasonableness set out in the Hunter 
case.  
While it is clear that a statute, which does not require a warrant prior to a search, is 
unconstitutional, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of Canada, instead of striking down 
legislations, uses the remedy of “reading down” to limit the provisions to accommodate exigent 
situation in which a warrant would be impracticable. 38  This exception necessitates an 
examination of reasonableness of a search and seizure without a warrant, supported by a statute 
but fails to meet the Hunter criteria. An analysis of this kind would be the most appropriate in 
the context of DNA collection from arrestees.  
                                                
36 DNA Fingerprint Act, 42 US Code §214135a. 
37 DNA Identification Act, SC  SCIdentifi 
38 Hogg supra note 5 at 48-25; also see, R v Grants, [2009] 2 SCR 353. 
  
The most comprehensive test to determine the reasonableness of a search without a 
warrant but mandated by a statute can be found in R v. Tessling, in which the Supreme Court of 
Canada was asked to determine whether the reasonable expectation of the privacy of Mr. 
Tessling was violated by an FLIR image taken by RCMP without prior judicial authorization. In 
answering the question and determining the respondent’s reasonable expectation of privacy, the 
court used the	  “Totality of the Circumstances”	  test.39 The Tessling test follows:  
 
1. What was the subject matter of the DNA information?  
2. Did the respondent have a direct interest in the subject matter of the DNA 
information?  
3. Did the respondent have a subjective expectation of privacy in the subject matter of the 
DNA information? 
4. If so, was the expectation objectively reasonable? 	  In this respect, regard must be had to: 
a. the place where the alleged “search”	  occurred; 
b. whether the subject matter was in public view;  
c. whether the subject matter had been abandoned;  
d. whether the information was already in the hands of third parties; 	  if so, 
was it subject to an obligation of confidentiality?  
e. whether the police technique was intrusive in relation to the privacy 
interest;  
f. whether the use of DNA analysis technology was itself objectively 
unreasonable;  
g. whether the DNA profile exposed any intimate details of the 
respondent’s lifestyle, or information of a biographical nature. 
   
Since, first three of the four prongs of the Tessling test and the factor (g) of the 4th prong 
(objective reasonableness) were discussed earlier in determining the existence of a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, instead of being repetitive, this analysis will only focus on the other 
                                                
39 Point to be noted that to make this test more relevant to the discussion of this paper, the word “FLIR” is replaced 
with “DNA” and “surveillance” was replaced with “DNA analysis technology”. 
  
factors of the objective reasonableness test of a search and seizure that involves collection of 
DNA.  
The place where a search occurs plays an extremely important role in respect to its 
reasonableness. In R. v. Stillman,40 an accused under custody, informed the police through his 
lawyers that he would not consent to the taking of any samples of his bodily fluids. The police 
were aware of his decision but nevertheless took possession of the tissue discarded by the 
accused while he was in custody. The Supreme Court of Canada states that although the 
accused’s expectation of privacy in this instance was lower, after his arrest, it was not so low as 
to permit the seizure of the tissue that contains his bodily substance. The privacy expectation 
should not be reduced to such an extent as to justify seizures of bodily samples without consent, 
particularly for those who are detained while they are still presumed to be innocent.41 However, 
this may be different if the accused voluntarily abandons any bodily fluids because in the same 
case, the court held that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy on the mucus that 
he had thrown away using a tissue paper.  
 
Applying these factors to the idea of DNA collection upon arrests, it could be concluded 
that such an attempt fails to comply with the aforementioned factors and is considered 
unreasonable unless an arrestee voluntarily provides his or her DNA samples. It should be noted 
that while in Stillman the court finds it reasonable to collect the abandoned samples of an 
arrestee, it might not be the case now because of the factor 4(d) of the Tessling test.  It can be 
argued that if Stillman was decided today, factor 4(d) of the Tessling test would restrict the 
                                                
40 Stillman supra note 30. 
41 Ibid. 
  
collection of abandoned bodily samples because they can be considered as confidential 
information held by a third party. Therefore, the only way DNA samples could be collected 
without a warrant is through voluntarily submission by the accused.  
The remaining factors and probably the most serious factors of this test are 4(e) and 4(f). 
Under the current Canadian Criminal Code, a DNA warrant can authorize one of the three 
investigative procedures for the collection of biological evidence from a suspect – (1) the 
plucking of individual hairs, including the root sheath;42 (2) the taking of buccal swabs by 
swabbing the lips, tongue, and inside cheeks of the mouth to collect epithelial cells;43 or (3) the 
taking of blood by pricking the skin surface with a sterile lancet.44 All of these methods are 
highly intrusive and unreasonable because an intrusion into an arrestee’s body to obtain a DNA 
sample cannot be considered minimal. The Supreme Court of the United States in Maryland v. 
King found the intrusion minimal because of the quickness of the DNA test and the lack of pain 
experienced by the arrestee during the test.45 On the other hand, it has been argued in contrary 
that the test itself may be quick and painless, but it cannot be minimally intrusive when it 
involves a governmental authority forcibly sticking a foreign object into a person's mouth 
without his or her consent.46  
While the American court finds such DNA collection technique and analysis reasonable, 
the Supreme Court of Canada seems to take a very different approach. The court held in R v. 
Pohoretsky that the issue of taking blood samples for law enforcement purposes is "a violation of 
the sanctity of a person's body [that] is much more serious than that of his office or even of his 
                                                
42 Section 487.06(1)(a). 
43 Section 487.06(1)(b). 
44 Section 487.06(1)(c). 
45Brian Clark Stuart, “Dethroning King: Why the Warrantless DNA Testing of Arrestees Should Be Prohibited 
Under State Constitutions (2014) 88 Missisipi LJ 1111 at 1135. 
46 Ibid. 
  
home."47 This theme has been picked up in subsequent cases as well. In the context of DNA 
samples, the court states:  
The taking of the dental impressions, hair samples and buccal swabs from the 
accused also contravened the appellant's s. 7 Charter right to security of the 
person. The taking of the bodily samples was highly intrusive. It violated the 
sanctity of the body which is essential to the maintenance of human dignity. It 
was the ultimate invasion of the appellant's privacy.48 
 
Furthermore, in Stillman, the court also equates unauthorized use of a person’s body or bodily 
substances with compelled “testimony”	  that could render a trial unfair. 	  Based on this reasoning, 
the court held that the security of the body is as worthy of protection from state intrusion aimed 
at compelled self-incrimination as are statements.49 Therefore, it becomes clear that both police 
techniques of DNA collection and its analysis both are highly intrusive and unreasonable. 
 
PART II: VIOLATION OF S. 11 (D) 
  The criminal justice system attempts to provide a normative basis for drawing an 
appropriate line between the state and individual interests through adopting certain legal 
doctrines such as the reasonable expectation of privacy, arbitrary detention, and principles of 
fundamental justice. However, one of the most celebrated legal doctrines in maintaining this 
balance is the presumption of innocence.50 This conception is constitutionally protected by the 
virtue of s. 11(d) of the Charter as it gives everyone the right "to be presumed innocent until 
                                                
47 R v Pohoretsky [1987] 1 SCR 945 at 5. 
48 Stillman supra note 30. 
49 Ibid.  
50 Thomas A Cromwell, "Proving Guilt: The Presumption of Innocence and the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms" in William H. Charles, Thomas A Cromwell & Keith B Jobson eds, Evidence and the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms (Toronto: Butterworths, 1989) at 125. 
  
proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial 
tribunal." 
 The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized in many decisions that the presumption of 
innocence has an omnipresent status in the criminal justice system and protects citizens at the 
pre-charge stage,51 which embraces a normative commitment to the view that all citizens are 
entitled to be presumed legally and factually innocent of a crime until they are legally and 
factually proven to be guilty.52 In a historic decision, R v. Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada 
describes the presumption of innocence as something that "protects the fundamental liberty and 
human dignity of any and every person accused by the State of criminal conduct," and further 
states that the presumption of innocence is essential in a society committed to fairness and social 
justice.53 
The idea "beyond reasonable doubt", which is derived from this notion of the presumption of 
innocence, puts the burden on the Crown to prove the guilt of an accused by a high degree or 
quantum of proof that proves the guilt beyond any doubt that a reasonable person can possibly 
have.54  In R. v. Lifchus, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a judge must undertake the 
difficult task of explaining the meaning of reasonable doubt to a jury and instruct them to 
maintain the presumption of innocence throughout the entire process.55  
                                                
51 The Supreme Court of Canada has repeatedly asserted that the presumption of innocence constitutes an animating 
principle throughout the criminal justice process. See, R v Pearson,[1992] 3 SCR 320 at para 31. 
52 Mark Heerema,, “ ark Heerema,ਐ Presumption of Factual Innocence in Canadian Law: A Theoretical Model for 
the "Pre-Charge Presumption of Innocence" (Fall, 2005) 28 Dalhousie LJ 443. 
53 Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 5th ed, (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 50. 
 
55  The court stated that the idea of reasonable doubt is not an imaginary or frivolous concept, thus, it must not be 
based upon sympathy or prejudice. Rather, it must be based upon reasoning and commonsense. While the court 
acknowledged that it will be impossible to prove guilt with 100% certainty, higher probability or likelihood that an 
accused has committed the crime is not sufficient for the conviction. The jury must feel that they are sure based on 
the evidence presented and commonsense that the accused has committed the crime and this is what beyond 
reasonable doubt means. See Rbe Lifchus, [1997] 3 SCR 320. 
  
It should not be forgotten that the importance of pre-charge and post-charge assumption of 
innocence are not the same since the aforementioned discussion shows only the significance of 
post-charge assumption of innocence. However, logically, maintaining the presumption of 
innocence at pre-charge level is more important because it embodies the normative commitment 
contained within the criminal justice system to presume that random bystanders are factually 
innocent; otherwise it will be impossible to live in a society and there will be no faith in 
humankind.56  
Requiring an arrestee who is not even charged to provide his bodily samples to put in a 
permanent DNA database does not conform to this doctrine of presumption of innocence, which 
is a fundamental value of the Canadian criminal justice system. In R. v. Rodgers, the court found 
it reasonable to collect DNA samples from the “convicted offenders” because these people were 
proven to be a threat to society beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, there was a strong public 
interest in their identification. However, collecting DNA from arrestees who are neither charged 
nor proven guilty of a crime or considered a threat to the society crosses any boundary of 
reasonableness. They could be any random innocent bystanders who happen to be at the wrong 
place at a wrong time. However, requiring them to provide their bodily samples which contain 
their most unique and personal information at this stage is another way of making them 
responsible (at least to some extent) for the crime committed, and makes it seem like they have  
to prove their innocence. This is a clear violation of their right to be presumed innocent as the 
Supreme Court of Canada said in R v. Whyte that if an accused is required to prove some fact on 
a balance of probabilities to avoid a conviction, the provision violates the presumption of 
                                                
56Mark Heerema, eUncovering the Presumption of Factual Innocence in Canadian Law: A Theoretical Model for the 
"Pre-Charge Presumption of Innocence"  (Fall, 2005) 28 Dalhousie LJ 443. 
  
innocence because it permits a conviction in spite of a reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier 
of fact as to the guilt of the accused.57 Consequently, a statute that would permit such 
infringement will be constitutionally invalid by the virtue of s. 11 (d) of the Charter. The only 
way such violation could be saved "if the existence of the substituted fact leads inexorably to the 
conclusion that the essential element exists, with no other reasonable possibilities, will the statutory 
presumption be constitutionally valid."58 However, the mere idea of collecting DNA from 
arrestees does not fall within this scope of exception and cannot be reasonable.      
 
PART III: JUSTIFICATION UNDER S.1:  
While the Charter guarantees certain rights and freedoms, it also makes it clear that they 
are not absolute and subject to reasonable limits set out in s. 1.59 Therefore, every claim of 
Charter rights violation is two folded – (a) whether or not an impugned legislation or 
government action limits an individual’s rights or freedoms set out in the Charter; and (b) if it 
does, can the limitation be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.60   
Throughout the previous sections, it was established that collecting DNA from arrestees 
infringes an individualns Charter protected rights and freedoms. Therefore, this section will look 
at the possibility of whether or not such an infringement could be justified. An important point, 
to be noted however, is that without having an actual wording and legislative framework, it will 
be virtually impossible to assess the actual implication and severity of a law that permits an 
                                                
57 R v Whyte, [1988] 2 SCR 3 at 5. 
58 R v Downey [1992] 2 SCR 10. 
59 It says “to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society”. 
60 Hogg supra note 5 at 38-1. 
  
infringement of the Charter. Moreover, it is still not very clear whether an analysis of s.1 is 
required in regards to a legislation or government action that violates s.8 of the Charter. It has 
been argued that it is redundant to conduct a s.1 analysis when a violation of s.8 is established 
because “it is difficult to imagine how an unreasonable search could nevertheless constitute a 
reasonable limit under section 1” and the reasonable standards that are supposed to make the 
balance between the state and individual interests are already incorporated within the reasonable 
standard under s.8.61 On the other hand, Hogg seems to suggest that there still remains a 
possibility that a law or government action found unreasonable relying on a narrow scale of 
reasonableness under s.8 may be found reasonable on a broader scale of reasonableness under 
s.1.62 Nevertheless, DNA collection from arrestees involves more rights than what is protected 
under s.8. Therefore, this essay will proceed to conducting an analysis of s.1. However, in doing 
so, only the very idea of DNA collection from arrestees and its possibility of justification under 
s. 1 of the Charter will be considered.  
In R v. Oakes, the Supreme Court of Canada sets out the requirements that must be met in 
order for an impugned legislation or government actions to be saved under s. 1.63 According to 
the Oakes Test, there are four basic requirements – (1) the law must have an objective that is 
sufficiently important to justify limiting a Charter right; (2) The law must be rationally 
connected to the objective; (3) the law must not impair the rights that is no more than necessary 
to accomplish that objective; and (4) the law must not have a disproportionally severe impact on 
the person to whom it applies. 64       
                                                
61 Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal procedure in Canada, Student Edition 
(Markham: Lexis Nexis, 2013) at 207. 
62 Hogg supra note 5 at 48. 
63 Also known as Oakes Test.  
64 R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103 at 138-139. 
  
Applying Oakes Test, there is no doubt that collecting DNA from the arrestees has an 
objective, which is to identify the suspects with better accuracy, something that is important to 
the criminal justice system. However, this is a very narrow and specified objective and perhaps 
too narrow to limit some of people’s most important rights. This objective will not be rationally 
connected to the law because there are many other less intrusive ways such as fingerprint and 
photograph that can be used to identify individuals. As mentioned earlier, DNA can reveal a 
significant amount of personal information about an individual such as personal genetic make up 
and core biological information. Collecting this information would not be considered rationally 
connected to the objective of the law and thus, would infringe more rights than necessary. As a 
result the collection of DNA would fail to meet first three prongs of the test. 
Moreover, as it is apparent from the previous discussion that collecting DNA is a highly 
intrusive process that involves bodily integrity and infringes some of the most fundamental 
rights, the violation cannot be minimal on a balance of probability. In justifying the DNA 
collection from arrestee in Maryland v. King, the Supreme Court of the United States holds that 
"the arrestee is already in valid police custody for a serious offense supported by probable 
cause.65" The court went as far as saying that the arrestee has a reduced privacy interest because 
he or she has "been suspected of a wrong". 66  However, if merely for the purpose of 
identification, it becomes necessary to collect DNA samples from people who are presumed to 
be innocent and not yet proven to be a threat for the society, then logically, it will also be 
justified to collect DNA evidence in every situation, which requires a person to identify him or 
herself (i.e. stopping a vehicle for speeding, accessing government facilities, entering to court 
                                                
65 Maryland supra note 1 at 9. 
66 Ibid at 25. 
  
rooms etc.). A free and democratic society cannot afford to extend the scope of privacy 
infringement to such an extent, especially by a government, which always has a serious interest 
in limiting individualsto extend the scope of  
 Finally, a legislation permitting collection of DNA from arrestees would 
disproportionally impact not only the person to whom it applies but also the society as a whole. 
First of all, collecting DNA from an individual and entering it in a national DNA database may 
create a psychological prison for the person. A person would not know how much information 
about him or her is in the hand of government and how the information will be handled.  He or 
she would constantly worry about the potential misuse of the information as the database is 
humanly operated and the information is vulnerable to abuse, misinterpretation and distortion. 
Also, the fact that the conviction rate of violent crimes in Canada is very low (52%), it means 
that almost half of the people whose rights and liberties will be taken away and be 
psychologically imprisoned are actually not criminals.67  
Allowing warrantless DNA collection of arrestees will disproportionately impact the 
members of visible minority68 and socially disadvantaged groups such as Aboriginal and Black 
communities. They will be unduly impacted because it is an open secret that the "Black 
community is subject to much greater police surveillance", and "much more likely to be caught 
when they break the law compared to White people who engage in the same forms of criminal 
activity".69 While it is very difficult to find actual statistic of racial arrests in Canada, as there is 
no requirement to record an arresteecret that the "Black community is subject to much greater 
                                                
67 In 2010/11, only 52% of violent-crime cases resulted in guilty rulings, 40% were stayed or withdrawn and 6% 
ended in acquittals.  See, Mia Dauvergne, Adult criminal court statistics in Canada, 2010/2011, Online: Statistics 
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69 Scot Wortley and Julian Tanner, Discrimination or ,Good”oPolicing? The Racial Profiling Debate in Canada, 
online: Metropolis, <http://canada.metropolis.net/pdfs/WortleyTanner_e.pdf>. 
  
police surveillance", and "much more likely to be caught when they black drug dealers (self-
identified) report that they have been arrested at some time in their lives, compared to only 35% 
of the White drug dealers (self-identified)”.70 Therefore, a significant numbers of people in the 
government DNA database would be the members of visible minority groups. Consequently, 
they will be more vulnerable to many different forms of discrimination, police suspicions and 
socio-legal marginalization.  
 
CONCLUSION:  
In conclusion, it is clear that although DNA collection might be a useful identification 
tool for law enforcement, it can reveal some of the most unique and biographical core of 
personal information about an individual that should not be under the possession of the 
government without prior judicial authorization based on probable cause. A search of arrestees 
that includes DNA collection without their consent or a valid warrant will always infringe on 
their right to reasonable expectation of privacy and deprive them from their right to be presumed 
innocent before proven legally and factually guilty. A statue that authorizes such a search will 
not meet the requirements and standards of reasonableness established by the Canadian courts 
and cannot be justified in a free and democratic society.  
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